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Abstract 
In this paper, a new method is proposed as an extension of the classic fault-tree analysis 
for the treatment of functionally re-configurable logic. Such logic may change its operation 
if a failure has occurred and been detected. Since this logic can distinguish between the 
detected failure and the undetected failure, these must be considered in the fault-tree 
structure. Closed formulas are applied to ensure efficient algorithm for the analysis. The 
paper summarizes that way which enables the treatment of re-configuration, and analyzes 
the limitations of the described methods. 
Keywords: fault-tree analysis. reliability analysis, re-configurable component, fault-tolerant 
system. 
1. Introduction 
In fault-tolerant, safety-oriented industrial systems, increasing availability 
is one of the most important objectives. General techniques for increasillg 
availability of systems include the use of more reliable components: the ap-
plication of more redundancy, ete. The dependability of the system can be 
examined by both deterministic and probabilistic ways. In the determin-
istic analysis the single failure criterion is examined, or other attributes of 
dependability, such as maintainability, testability, ete. can be analyzed. In 
the probabilistic analysis, availability is measured by the system operation 
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without malfunction, or unavailability is calculated as a probability or a 
frequency of a non-desired system function. The system must reach certain 
predefined limits, which are set by authorities or based on experience from 
previous developments. 
Nowadays, the application of fault-adaptive, functionally re-configur-
able components is a frequently used method for increasing availability. This 
type of component may change its function if the failure has occurred and 
been detected in order to neglect the failure and prevent its spreading. The 
condition for this ability is the information about the failure occurred, which 
can be provided, e.g. by a status signal from a failure detection mechanism. 
The fault-tree analysis (FTA) is widely used in industrial systems, 
e.g. power generation systems, vehicle systems, because its methodology 
is well elaborated and a large number of efficient analysis procedures exist, 
(BoKoR et al. 1997: BRo\v, 1990). The objective of the FTA is to calculate 
the availability or unavailability of the system, but other useful information 
can also be gained about the structure of the system, (ApOSTOLAKIS et 
al. 1978; CHUNN!NG and DINGHUA, 1990; SCHNEEWEIS, 1985: STECHER, 
1986). Besides the probability of the analyzed top event, the traditional 
FTA can also provide other useful information such as the importance of 
components, the sensitivity of components and a set of basic events, called 
IvICS, which can be selected according to the following. The top event will 
occur if all basic events of the MCS have occurred, but if at least one basic 
event does not occur the top event will not occur (HWANG et al. 1981; 
LEE et al. 1985). Thus, the minimal cut sets show how many individual 
component failures are needed for the system failure, so the weak points of 
the system can be determined, thus the single failure criterion can also be 
analyzed based on fault- trees. It can be investigated hO\'7 the availability of 
the system increases (or decreases) if failure rates of different components 
increase (or decrease) which is the basis of the importance analysis. The 
components, to which the availability of the system is extremely sensitive 
and also the kind of components to which it is not sensitive can be selected. 
One of the most important difficulties in FTA is the treatment of dy-
namic components, e.g. hot and cold spares, priority logic, etc. In the 
literature, several methods are developed to take these components into ac-
count in FTA, e.g. DOYLE et al., 1995; GULAT! and DUG AN , 1997; KAL 
1990. 
In this paper, the treatment method of re-configurable components is 
proposed. Moreover, the three-state model is introd uced instead of the two-
state model in the traditional FTA. When a re-configurable component is 
modeled, the two states (event has been occurred or not) are not adequate, 
since the component has three possible states: the failure has occurred and 
been detected, the failure has occurred and not been detected and the failure 
project has been supported by the Hungarian National Science Foundation 
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has not occurred. Traditional tools can also handle the problem by dividing 
the detected and undetected failures and modeling the adaptivity with the 
basic traditional gates, but this method causes certain difficulties (G . .\SP . .\R 
and SZABO, 1998). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Chapter 2, the definition of 
the active and the adaptive logic is introduced, and the handling of this logic 
is illustrated by the so-called macro models. In Chapter 3, closed formulas 
are suggested to ensure unified treatment of the gates with different number 
of inputs. In Chapter 4, a demonstration example is illustrated for the 
handling of the adaptive iogic and several application subjects are outlined 
from transportation engineering. 
2. Definiti.on and Treatrnent of Re-Configurable Logic 
2.1. Definition of Active and Adaptive Logic 
An average system can consist of the following operation modes or functions. 
@ Normal functions: These functions cannot distinguish the detected 
failure from the undetected failure. 
@ Active functions: These functions send forward information about the 
success of the function execution or the fault. However. these func-
tions cannot change their actually executed functions according to this 
information. 
€!I Adaptive functions: These functions can change their actual function 
dynamically according to the faulty input or failure status and can pro-
vide information about the success of the execution. E.g. in the case 
of an adaptive AND function with 3 redundant inputs, the first de-
tected failure causes a re-configuration to another AND function with 
2 inputs and the failed input is blocked. In the case of an adaptive 2-
out-of-3 (2v3) logic, the first detected failure causes a re-configuration 
of the function, which can be modeled with a 2v2 logic. Moreover, 
the second detected failure causes further re-configuration to an AND 
logic with one valid input and two blocked inputs. 
2.2. iVfacro Models: a Traditional Solution for Modeling the 
Re-Configuration 
The traditional fault-tree analysis is capable of modeling the active or adap-
tive system functions. Since for adequate modeling the detected and the 
undetected failures must be distinguished at the basic event level, and since 
the fault-tree models of active and adaptive components also require the 
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distinction of these failure modes, every event in a fault-tree model must be 
described by two, separated probabilities. 
A macro model for active and adaptive functions cannot be set up 
by using only the traditional fault-tree gates (AND, OR, K-out-of-N). This 
modeling requires the supplementary gates of the traditional fault-tree (NOT, 
XOR). Fig. 1 shows the macro model of a normal 2v3 function, Fig. 2 shows 
the active and Fig. 3 the adaptive ones. 
The macro model solution has several disadvantages: 
lil As the number of inputs increase, the macro model will become ex-
tremely complex. 
~ If macro models are used at different levels of the fault-tree, the anal-
ysis will require cl. long period of time. 
lil The models cannot handle the relationships bet\veen detected and un-
detected failures. 
2.3. Closed Formulas for the Re-Configurable Logic in FTA 
The calculation of probability of the different states can be formalized in such 
a way that only the probabilities of the detected failure and the undetected 
failure are used. In the following, closed formulas are presented in the case 
of different types of gates, namely the OR gate, the AND gate, and the KvN 
gate. 
An OR gate has an output failure if at least one of the inputs has 
a failure. If the logic cannot distinguish bet\veen detected and undetected 
failures on the input side, the probability of the output failure can be calcu-
lated by using a simple OR formula of the failures. This value is considered 
as an undetected failure at the next level. The information that an input 
failure has occurred may be used in the re-configuration step of this logic in 
order to realize a new function using the other inputs, which are assumed 
to be error-free. From the point of view of failures, the active logic can 
distinguish between detected failures and undetected failures, however, be-
cause this type cannot change the function the sum of the two probabilities 
is the same as the probability of the normal OR gate. In the case of adap-
tive logic, the first detected failure causes a re-configuration of this gate to 
another OR gate with the other inputs, and the failed input is blocked. Let 
PDi be the probability of the detected failure of thei th input. and Ps, be 
the probability of the undetected failure. The formulas of probabilities of 
detected and undetected failures are shown in Table 1. 
In the case of an AND gate, the advantages shown in the previous 
paragraph do not arise, because a failure only occurs on the output if de-
tected failures occur on all of the inputs. In the case of an active AND gate, 
detected failure is indicated on the output if all of the inputs have detected 
failure. It is unnecessary to define the adaptive type of this gate because if 
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the input signal with detected failure is omitted from the calculation, the 
type of function is not affected. The formulas of probabilities of detected 
and undetected failures are shown in Table 2. 
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Fig. 1. Illustration of normal 2v3 logic using the macro model 
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Fig. 2. Illustration of active 2v3 logic using the macro model 
The traditional KvN gate cannot distinguish between detected and 
undetected failures, the output failure probability is treated as undetected 
failure probability, hmvever, active and adaptive logic can distinguish be-
tween detected and undetected failures. E.g. in the case of the adaptive 2v3 
gate, the fi.rst detected failure causes a re-confi.guration that can be mod-
eled with a 2v2 gate. The effect of the second detected failure is a further 
re-confi.guration to a gate that passes the third input to the output. The 
formulas of probabilities of detected and undetected failures are shown in 
Table 3. As an illustration, the framework of the proofs is shown in the 
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Fig. J. Illustration of adaptive 2v3 logic using the macro model 
Appendix for the creation of the closed formulas in the case of three inputs. 
Table 1. The probability of detected and the undetected failures of the OR gate 
Failure 
Normal 
Active 
detected 
Active 
undetected 
Adaptive 
detected 
Adaptive 
undetected 
11 pl\ormal OR 
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Table 2. The probability of detected and the undetected failures of the AND gate 
Failure 
!\'ormal 
Active 
detected 
Active 
undetected 
Equation 
I 
P Normal AND l 
pActive. nN l' p ) _ pAdaptive 
Det,AND = DJ - Det,AND 
J=l 
IN ] Adantive 1]1 (PA)) = PUn det,AND 
Table 3. The Probability of detected and the undetected failures of the KvN gate 
Failure 
Normal 
Active 
detected 
Active 
unde-
tected 
Adaptive 
detected 
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3. Application of the Theory 
3.1. Demonstration Example 
In the example, a part of a coach door control system will be analyzed for 
reliability. The system contains three sensors for each door to sense the 
open or closed state of the door (triple redundancy), and the sensors are 
connected to a processor-based central controller via an RS-485 bus, see 
Fig. 4. Among others the tasks of the central controller are to observe the 
door state (open or closed); to prevent the coach from departing with open 
doors; and if one of the doors opens while the vehicle is moving, to decrease 
the speed of the coach to zero by actuating the brake system. 
The central controller processes the signals from sensors by majority 
voting, in this case a 2v3 logic. The processing mode is normal, if any failure 
.of two of the three sensors causes a malfunction of the central controller. 
In our example, a failure of the vehicle's central bus causes the loss of the 
three sensor signals, consequently, the activation of brakes. Adaptive (or 
re-configurable) processing mode is applied if the detected failures in the 
input information (the signals coming from the sensors) of the central con-
troller have a different effect on the system than the undetected failures. 
In our case, the signal of a sensor with a detected failure can be ignored, 
consequently, the system can operate with two detected failures as ,vell as 
with good signals. If all of the input signals of the central controller faiL we 
have the ability to choose the solution with the kno·,vledge of malfunction 
in the system. 
Sensors 
To the actuator 
(brake system) 
Central controller (l-lP) 
RS~~~bJl,----------, 
Fig. 4. Coach door control system (simplified) for demonstration purposes 
Besides the two operating modes mentioned above there is a third 
mode: it does not provide all of the advantages of the adaptive mode, but 
provides the ability to detect a malfunction. The operation mode is active if 
the logic does not take the statuses of the signals (failed or not) into account 
when calculating the output signal (the result), but based on the statuses, it 
calculates an output status information, which signals if the result cannot be 
valid due to the detected failures (e.g. two detected failures in a 2v3 logic). 
This information can be applied in large systems for further processing. 
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Below we will demonstrate the solutions described in the paper for 
adaptive components. Fig. 5 shows a fault-tree built for the system ignoring 
the adaptive function. This fault tree is very simple and a traditional 2v3 
gate represents the voting function. Of course the results from an analysis 
of this fault tree will be different from the real values because of ignoring, 
but in some cases the difference is acceptable. This method can be applied 
when the probability of detected failures is much less than the probability 
of undetected failures. As shown in Fig. 5, the detected and undetected 
failures are not distinguished in this case and treated together as a single 
failure of an element. 
In Fig. 6 an application of macro models is presented. The fault tree 
uses a macro model not only for adaptive 2v3 logic, but for the logical CDn-
nection of bus and sensor failures. This logical connection can be modeled 
as an active OR function: if one of the two corn Donents considered (one 
sensor and the bus) has a detected failure, the ceDt~al controller can ch~nge 
its function. Because this is a logical connection of failures and not a real 
function, it cannot be adaptive. 
Of course, the application of macro models can be simplified on the 
fault-tree as well as we can simplify the fault trees for closed formulas, using 
special gates for the drawing. This is shmvn in Fig. 7. In this case, the lines 
in the fault tree represent the detected and the undetected failures and the 
events have three states as described in the previous part of the paper. 
Fig. 5. Traditional fault tree of the system 
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Fig. 6. Application of macro models 
3.2. Some Applications in Traffic Automation 
The main areas of application for fault-tree analysis in transportation are the 
aviation, space and vehicle technology, where electrical and mechanical com-
ponents must be analyzed together, (DUGAN et al., 1990: CHARLESWORTH 
and RAo, 1985). Aviation and space technology require fault-tolerant sys-
tems because no safety state of the machine or its control su bsystems can be 
found. The speciality of the space vehicles is that during the mission time 
(or the whole life-cycle of the components) it is not possible to maintain 
the components. Testing and failure detection are also important in these 
cases, because switching to the spare unit requires the knowledge of a fault 
and (mainly at the end of the life-cycle, when spares are no longer available) 
fault-adaptive techniques can ensure a longer life-cycle. 
The availability analysis becomes more important in some non-safety 
oriented areas in transportation because of the increasing demands of cus-
tomers. Truck and van central braking systems are good example of this, 
(LIMING et al., 1996; HUDOKLIN and RozMAN, 1985). 
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Gate types: n A ~ 
Nonnal T Active I AdaPtive~ 
Fig. 7. Fault-tree for closed formulas 
Conclusion 
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In this paper we have introduced closed formulas ensuring the treatment 
of functionally re-configurable logic in fault-tree analysis and we have also 
showed the application in a demonstration example. The formulas are valid 
for any number of inputs, thus the detected and the undetected failure 
probability can be calculated, which is a more efficient way than developing 
the related macro models and incorporating them into the fault-tree. It 
seems necessary to use the extended fault-tree analysis in the reliability 
analysis of transportation systems. 
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